Why did British Electricity Prices Fall after 1998? by Evans, Joanne & Green, Richard J.
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics CWPE 0326 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Why Did British Electricity Prices Fall after 
1998? 
 
Joanne Evans and Richard Green  
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                            
         
          
 
    
   Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
             Center for Energy and 
      Environmental Policy Research 
 
CMI Working Paper 26 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Not to be quoted without permission 
 
 
 
 
         








 
        
         


    M	






      




 
CMI Working Paper  
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE
Department of
Applied Economics
Why did British electricity prices fall after 1998? 
 
Joanne Evans and Richard Green* 
University of Hull  
 
Centre for Economic Policy 
University of Hull Business School 
Hull HU6 7RX 
 
Tel: +44 1482 465720 
Fax: +44 1482 466216 
Email:  j.e.evans@hull.ac.uk, r.j.green@hull.ac.uk 
 
January 2003 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In an attempt to reduce high electricity prices in England and Wales the 
government has reduced concentration among generators and introduced 
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA).  Econometric analysis on 
monthly data from April 1996 to September 2002 implies support for two 
conflicting hypotheses.  On a static view, increases in competition and the 
capacity margin were chiefly responsible for the fall in prices.  If 
generators had been tacitly colluding before NETA, however, the 
impending change in market rules might have changed their behaviour a 
few months before the abolition of the Pool.  That view implies that 
NETA reduced prices.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a truth universally acknowledged, that an electricity market with high prices is in want of 
a remedy.  The causes of high prices include insufficient generation capacity, market power 
stemming from excess concentration among generators, and inappropriate market rules.  The 
natural remedies are, in turn, to encourage the addition of more generation capacity, to 
negotiate or impose a more competitive market structure, and to change the market rules.  In 
England and Wales, electricity prices in the second half of the 1990s were persistently above 
the costs of new entrants.  Towards the end of the decade, more capacity was added, and two 
of the largest generators divested a significant proportion of their plant.  On March 27, 2001, a 
new set of trading rules came into force.  Wholesale prices are now 40% lower than when the 
industry’s regulator first suggested reforming the trading system. 
 England and Wales have thus experienced all three of the classical remedies for high 
electricity prices.  This paper is an attempt to assess which of those remedies had the greatest 
impact on the level of electricity prices.  In particular, we hope to shed light on the extent to 
which the adoption of the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) directly caused the 
drop in wholesale prices which occurred at about the same time.   
 The next section of the paper considers the history of the electricity industry in 
England and Wales and the decision to introduce NETA.  Section 3 considers some of the 
prior academic work on market power in the electricity industry.  Section 4 introduces the 
regressions that we have run to measure the impact of NETA, and of other changes during this 
period.  Sections 5 and 6 present our results, and section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
The electricity industry in England and Wales was restructured on March 31, 1990.  The state-
owned Central Electricity Generating Board was divided into the National Grid Company, 
responsible for transmission, and three generating companies.  Two of these, National Power 
and PowerGen, with 50% and 30% of the industry’s capacity respectively, were privatised in 
February 1991.  Nuclear Electric owned almost all of the remainder, but was kept in state 
ownership, as its nuclear reactors were believed to be too expensive to privatise.  A failed 
attempt to privatise the nuclear stations had been the main motive for creating a company as 
large as National Power, in the hope that it would be large enough to absorb the risks of 
nuclear power.  The stations had to be withdrawn from the sale in November 1989, and there 
was not enough time for significant changes to the restructuring plan. 
 The centre-piece of the restructuring was a spot market known as the Pool.  Each day, 
this accepted bids from all the generators, and used a version of the CEGB’s cost-minimising 
software to draw up an operating schedule and to calculate the System Marginal Price (SMP) 
for each half-hour.  This was broadly equal to the average bid cost of the marginal station in 
each half-hour.  Generators received the SMP for every unit of output that they were 
scheduled to generate, and received a capacity payment for every MW of available capacity.  
This payment was equal to the Loss of Load Probability multiplied by the net Value of Lost 
Load.   
 The cost of deviations from the schedule, due to forecasting errors, plant failures, and 
transmission constraints, of making capacity payments to generators who had not been 
scheduled to generate, and of buying ancillary services such as reserve, were recovered in a 
charge called Uplift.  Uplift was added to the Pool Purchase Price to give the Pool Selling 
Price (PSP), payable by all suppliers for every unit that they bought through the Pool.   
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 Legally, almost all electricity had to be traded through the Pool, although in practice, 
most of it was hedged with contracts for differences, which allowed generators to “lock in” 
their revenues in advance.  In 1990, most of the generators’ sales were hedged with three-year 
“coal-related” contracts at relatively high prices, above the expected level of Pool prices.  
This was because Pool prices were expected to be related to the marginal cost of generating 
using imported coal, while the generators were contracted to buy large quantities of British 
coal at higher prices.  The coal-related contracts passed the difference in cost on to the 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), which were in turn allowed to pass the cost on to 
their (captive) smaller customers. 
 In its first year, Pool prices (shown in figure 1) were lower than expected, in part 
because the generators were competing to burn as much coal as possible.  Over the following 
years, however, average Pool prices rose significantly, while there were suggestions that the 
generators were “gaming” particular aspects of the rules to increase their revenues.  The 
industry’s regulator issued a series of reports which criticised some aspects of this behaviour, 
but conceded that while prices were below the major generators’ avoidable costs, it was 
reasonable for them to increase.  By July 1993, however, the regulator concluded that prices 
had now risen above the level of the generators’ avoidable costs, and announced that he 
would decide whether he should refer them to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.   
In February 1994, he announced that he had decided not to refer the companies to the 
MMC, at least for a two-year period.  This was because they had given him undertakings to 
sell or otherwise dispose of 6 GW of plant, and to keep prices below a specified level during 
1994/5 and 1995/6, while the sales were being arranged.  National Power eventually leased 4 
GW of plant to Eastern Electricity, while PowerGen leased 2 GW.  Eastern had agreed to pay 
an “earn-out” of £6/MWh for each unit that the leased stations generated, which raised its 
bids, while the company also proved adept at exploiting loopholes in the Pool rules to 
increase its revenues.  The flow of reports from the regulator continued. 
 In the autumn of 1997, it became clear that the demand for coal was due to fall 
significantly when the second round of “coal-related” electricity contracts expired in April 
1998.  The expiry of the first round had provoked a political crisis for the Conservative 
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0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Apr-90 Apr-91 Apr-92 Apr-93 Apr-94 Apr-95 Apr-96 Apr-97 Apr-98 Apr-99 Apr-00 Apr-01 Apr-02
PSP
SMP
Figure 1
£/MWh
 3   
government of the day, while the new Labour government had strong emotional ties to the 
coal industry.  Coal had been displaced by the new CCGTs, and the high level of wholesale 
prices continued to encourage entry, even though the avoidable costs of the displaced coal 
stations were arguably lower than those of the CCGTs replacing them.1  A temporary 
moratorium on new gas-fired stations gave the coal industry some hope, while the regulator 
was asked to conduct a review of electricity trading arrangements, to examine whether these 
had been responsible for some of the problems in the industry. 
 The review concluded that the Pool had a large number of faults, and that it should be 
replaced by new electricity trading arrangements (NETA) (Offer, 1998).  The Pool’s single-
price rule was argued to make it easier for generators to exploit their market power, since they 
could submit low bids for part of their capacity, guaranteeing that it would run, while a small 
number of high bids would set the price for the whole market.  This price umbrella had also 
encouraged the entry that was driving down the demand for coal.  The Pool’s complexity had 
created many opportunities for gaming, while the market’s compulsory nature went against 
the principle of freedom of choice.  These arguments were not uncontroversial (see e.g. 
Newbery, 1998b, Green, 1999a), but were accepted by the government. 
 The Department of Trade and Industry and the regulator (now called Ofgem) together 
created the New Electricity Trading Arrangements, based upon bilateral trading and a 
balancing mechanism to keep the system stable in the last few hours before real time.  The 
balancing mechanism was the only centrally-designed market, and more than 95% of 
electricity is traded on over-the-counter markets or power exchanges.  Traders have to notify 
NGC of their intended physical position at “Gate Closure”, originally set 3½ hours before real 
time, but brought forward to one hour before real time in July 2002.  Generators and suppliers 
submit bids and offers to adjust those positions, and NGC keeps the market in balance by 
accepting some of these.  The average cost of the accepted bids (to buy power from NGC) is 
the System Sell Price, while the average cost of the accepted offers (to sell additional power 
to NGC) is the System Buy Price.  On average, the System Buy Price is much higher than the 
System Sell Price.  After the event, the Balancing and Settlement Company, Elexon, 
compares every firm’s contractual position with its physical position.  Companies which were 
short of power have to buy some at the System Buy Price, while those with a surplus are paid 
the System Sell Price.  Companies with supply and generation have separate imbalances for 
each side of their business.  Because the System Buy Price is generally much higher than the 
System Sell Price, imbalances are costly, and this was intended to give participants an 
incentive to balance their positions before Gate Closure.  In practice, companies seem to have 
been anxious to minimise their exposure to the System Buy Price, which is much the more 
volatile, and have generally had a surplus of power at Gate Closure, rather than a balanced 
position.  
 The government and the regulator hoped that changing from the Pool to NETA, which 
finally took effect on March 27, 2001, would in itself reduce the generators’ market power.  
There were other developments in the run-up to the new market’s introduction, however.  In 
June 1998, the regulator had recommended that the major generators should be required to 
divest more of their plant, and the government had accepted this recommendation in its 
response to the NETA proposals.  PowerGen offered to divest 4 GW of plant if it was allowed 
to acquire East Midlands Electricity, and National Power was required to divest 4 GW in 
return for acquiring Midlands Electricity’s supply business.  Both companies followed these 
sales with others that were completely voluntary, however.  They may have expected prices to 
fall in future, and preferred to sell plant at prices that seem not to have reflected these 
expectations. 
                                                          
1
 Until the decision to build a new station has been made, practically all of its costs are avoidable, unlike the 
capital costs of an existing coal station.  
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 National Power divided itself into two companies, Innogy (with most of the UK 
assets) and International Power (with one UK power station and the company’s overseas 
assets).  Innogy subsequently bought two more REC supply businesses (Yorkshire and 
Northern).  Eastern Electricity, which had been renamed TXU, bought a second supply 
business (Norweb), as did London Electricity, owned by Electricite de France (SWEB).  
British Energy, which had been privatised with the more modern nuclear plants in 1996, 
started to move towards vertical integration by acquiring Swalec’s supply business, but sold 
the business within two years, realising that it was unlikely to acquire the five million 
customers generally believed to confer minimum efficient scale.  The company bought a 2 
GW coal-fired station instead, to help in balancing its inflexible nuclear stations.  Swalec’s 
supply business was acquired by Scottish and Southern Energy, which combined Southern 
Electric and Hydro-Electric.2 
 This means that by the time NETA took effect, the generation side of the industry was 
less concentrated than when it was first suggested, and there was also much more vertical 
integration.  Academic work on electricity markets suggests that the combination of reduced 
concentration and increased integration was likely to reduce prices.   
 
 
 
3. MARKET POWER IN ELECTRICITY 
 
The first studies of market power in the British electricity markets were written soon after 
those markets were established.  Green and Newbery (1992) argued that an electricity pool 
could be modelled as if generators competed by submitting supply functions, and showed that 
the equilibrium of this model in a concentrated industry would imply prices well above 
marginal costs.  Von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) produced similar conclusions using an 
auction approach.  Their results draw out an explicit link between the amount of spare 
capacity in the industry and the level of prices: prices will be much higher if neither firm is 
capable of meeting demand on its own.  
 Wolfram (1998, 1999) studied bids and prices in the England and Wales market.  She 
found that the mark-ups between price and marginal cost were higher when demand was 
above the median level, and that generators tended to submit higher bids, relative to marginal 
costs, the greater the level of capacity that was infra-marginal to the bidding plant.  Sweeting 
(2001) finds that mark-ups in a given quarter are generally higher when there is little spare 
capacity.  He finds that mark-ups vary over time, however, and relates this to changes in 
concentration and to collusion.  In particular, he suggests that generators changed their 
behaviour from not exploiting their (considerable) market power in the mid-1990s to 
exploiting the (much lower) degree of market power that remained to them, and possibly even 
colluding3 by the end of his sample period in 2000.  
An alternative explanation for changes in generators’ behaviour over time, to which 
both Sweeting and Wolfram allude, is a change in their contractual position.  Powell (1993), 
Newbery (1998a) and Green (1999b) all show that if generators have covered most of their 
output with contracts for differences, they will have little incentive to raise the price in the 
spot market.  Green showed that the major generators had covered most of their output with 
contracts during the first five years of the Pool, even though the falling volumes of coal-
                                                          
2
 After the end of our period, London Electricity took over Seeboard, while PowerGen acquired the Eastern and 
Norweb supply businesses from their near-bankrupt owner, TXU Europe. 
3
 By colluding, Sweeting implies that the generators were producing less output than would have been privately 
profitable in a one-shot game, given their costs and the supply functions submitted by the other market 
participants. 
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related contracts meant that they could have allowed their contract cover to decline 
significantly. 
 The key result for our purposes is that a generator that has fully covered its expected 
output with contracts for differences will bid that level of output at marginal cost.  Its bids for 
output above that level will be above marginal cost, while its bids for output below the 
contracted level would optimally be below marginal cost.  Wolak (2000) uses very detailed 
data from the Australian electricity market to illustrate how these relationships held in 
practice.  While we must be careful in moving between the absolute level of output and the 
level relative to the generator’s contractual position (since this position will change from 
season to season), we might still expect this effect to give a positive relationship between 
demand and mark-ups.   
 There are a number of theoretical studies of the impact of different market rules.  
Bower and Bunn (2000) used a simulation model to predict that moving from a daily auction 
with a uniform price to hourly auctions with discriminatory pricing (i.e., from a simplification 
of the Pool system to NETA) would lead to higher prices.  Fabra (2002), however, shows in a 
theoretical model that a discriminatory auction is less vulnerable to the exercise of market 
power than a uniform-price auction is.  The uniform-price auction allows generators to 
receive a high price while still submitting low bids, and therefore minimising the pay-off from 
deviating to a more competitive strategy.  Fabra et al (2002) compare several auction formats 
and find that their welfare ranking is ambiguous – uniform price auctions are (weakly) more 
efficient, but a discriminatory auction is (weakly) better for consumer surplus.  In other 
words, the switch to NETA might be expected to reduce prices. 
Bower (2002) is the only other empirical study of the impact of NETA that we are 
aware of.  He estimates equations for monthly average prices from April 1990 to March 2002, 
using fuel prices, concentration, the level of demand, and regulatory interventions as his main 
explanatory variables.  Our work is in many ways a response to his, sharing some of his 
approach.  We discuss his results in more detail below, once we have explained our own 
choice of explanatory variables. 
 
  
4. MODELS AND DATA 
 
The discussion of the previous section suggests that the level of concentration and the margin 
between available demand and capacity are key determinants of mark-ups in the electricity 
industry, along with the (generally unobservable) level of contracting.  It is straightforward to 
obtain data for Pool prices, and we concentrate on monthly averages of the System Marginal 
Price and the Pool Selling Price (including Transmission Uplift from its introduction in April 
1997, since this represents costs previously included in Uplift). Since NETA, the closest 
equivalent to Pool prices is the UKPX Reference Price Data,4 which gives an average of the 
prices in the UKPX’s market, operating in the last day or so before real time.  When looking 
at SMP, we use the UKPX price on its own as our post-NETA price.  When looking at PSP, 
we need to add the costs of transmission and system balancing.  NGC publishes its Balancing 
Services Use of System Charge, while Elexon publishes figures for the Residual Cash-flow 
Reallocation, which recycles any net profit from settling imbalances to market participants.5  
A true picture of the costs that suppliers face under NETA would also include the costs of 
                                                          
4
 UKPX Reference Price Data is used under licence agreement with OM London.  The UKPX is the UK Power 
Exchange, the leading short-term market for electricity in England and Wales.  
5
 NGC has normally needed to buy surplus power from participants who have avoided the System Buy Price by 
going long, and so this Reallocation has sometimes actually required market participants to give more money to 
NGC. 
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imbalances.  We have daily volumes of positive and negative consumption imbalances.  We 
therefore assume that suppliers purchased their actual demand, plus their positive imbalance, 
less their negative imbalance, at the daily average of the UKPX Reference Price Data, sold 
their positive imbalance at the daily average of the System Sell Price, and bought their 
negative imbalance at the daily average of the System Buy Price.  We divide the total by the 
actual level of demand to get the average cost per MWh.  This might underestimate the cost of 
imbalances, if the System prices are positively correlated with the level of imbalances in 
particular half-hours, but half-hourly imbalance data were not available to us. Finally, we 
reduce the post-NETA prices to reflect the fact that suppliers now only pay 55% of 
transmission losses.  Under the Pool, their metered demands were scaled up by an average of 
1.5% so that metered demand (on the transmission system) equalled metered generation, and 
the Pool Selling Price was applied to this scaled demand.  Under NETA, demand is scaled by 
little more than half this amount, reducing the effective cost to suppliers.  
 We use a simplified merit order model to estimate the marginal cost of power.  We 
have data on the monthly registered capacity of power stations in England and Wales, and on 
the monthly cost of fuel.  We use the price paid by Major Power Producers for gas and for oil, 
as reported in Energy Trends, and Eurostat figures on the monthly cost of imports into the UK 
for coal.6  We believe that the import cost is a better reflection of the marginal cost of coal 
than the price paid by the major power producers, which reflected the high-price, but fixed 
volume, 1993-98 coal contracts.  To reduce volatility in the Eurostat data, we take a three-
month moving average.  We assume thermal efficiencies of between 31% and 37% for coal 
stations, 43% and 53% for CCGTs, and 36% for oil stations.  To account for the “earn-out”, 
we added £6/MWh to the marginal cost of the stations that Eastern leased from the major 
generators during the relevant periods.  In the case of the 2 GW of ex-PowerGen stations, this 
was between July 1996 and March 2000 (inclusive), while in the case of the 4 GW of capacity 
leased from National Power, the earn-out lasted from June 1996 until December 2000.  
 We do not attempt to adjust the capacity of fossil-fuelled stations for actual 
availability, since this was potentially a strategic variable for the generators, but scale back 
the registered capacity of fossil stations by between 10% (winter) and 20% (summer) to 
account for outages.  Nuclear capacity is similarly sculpted between months, and then scaled 
to track the actual annual figures for nuclear output.  We estimate marginal cost for the 
monthly peak demand, the 5th percentile, 10th percentile, and so on, and take the unweighted 
average of these costs.7  This ensures that we capture the convexity of the marginal cost 
curve.   
Our estimated marginal cost followed the expected seasonal pattern (i.e., higher in 
winter) in most years, and was highest towards the end of our sample, when fuel prices rose.  
This gave us a problem in estimation, since the correlation with low electricity prices at the 
end of the sample gave us negative coefficients when we regressed the level of electricity 
prices on a model including the level of marginal costs.  We therefore imposed the 
appropriate sign on marginal costs by using the Lerner index (the unweighted average price 
over the month minus the average marginal cost, divided by price) as our dependent variable.  
 We estimate parsimonious regressions with two main explanatory variables. Our data 
on monthly registered capacities allowed us to calculate a Herfindahl index for overall 
capacity ownership, summing the squared shares of capacity.  As before, we do not attempt to 
adjust this for actual plant availability.  While it is easy to show that the relationship between 
the Herfindahl index and the Lerner index in an industry of symmetric Cournot (quantity-
                                                          
6
 We have recently extended our data-set, and used Energy Trends figures (which had converged with the 
Eurostat data) for the last six months of coal prices as an interim measure. 
7
 We did not have the actual monthly load-duration curves for July 1999 to March 2001, but fitted the average of 
the curves for the corresponding months earlier in our sample to the average demand level for that month. 
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setting) firms is linear, most supply functions are non-linear.  Furthermore, Green and 
Newbery’s work (1992) suggests that there might be a non-linear relationship between the 
number of firms in the industry and the position of the industry’s supply function.  We 
therefore use both the Herfindahl index and its square as explanatory variables. 
Our second main explanatory variable was the ratio of average demand during the 
month to registered capacity.  The first variable is intended to pick up the effect of 
competition on prices, while the second is intended to capture the effect of the level of spare 
capacity available.8 
 We have 78 monthly observations from April 1996 until September 2002.  Prices 
between April 1994 and March 1996 were distorted by the generators’ undertaking on Pool 
prices, while price behaviour in the very early years of the Pool was dominated by the effects 
of the coal contracts.  The last five years of the Pool gives us a reasonable length of data, with 
a varying amount of regulatory pressure.  We currently have eighteen months of data after the 
introduction of NETA, and hope to lengthen this sample period as soon as the data 
(particularly for fuel costs) are available.   
We introduce a dummy variable for the month of September 2000 in some of our 
regressions based on PSP.  Capacity payments in this month averaged £20.28/MWh, the third-
highest monthly level in the Pool’s history, yet September is a month of low demand.  
Ofgem’s investigation (Ofgem, 2000) revealed that the high level of capacity payments was 
due to the way in which the Pool’s algorithms had treated the particular mix of plant available 
to the system during that month, rather than due to any withholding by generators.  It is 
arguable that a month of “freak” prices of this kind, occurring at a time of relatively low 
concentration, will tend to bias down our estimates of the true impact of concentration, and 
raise our estimate of the impact of NETA, since the prices were neither sought, nor directly 
caused, by the generators.  The counter-argument is that the abolition of the Pool was 
expressly intended to ensure that we never again suffer from freak prices, and that a true 
assessment of the effectiveness of different measures to reduce prices must take account of 
the Pool’s enduring ability to produce anomalous results.  We therefore report results both 
with and without the dummy variable. 
Bower (2002) uses data on concentration in different plant types, and the price of 
several different fuels, as his independent variables, together with a number of variables to 
reflect regulatory interventions between 1990 and 2002.  Most of these are dummy variables, 
but he also uses the volume of coal covered by government-backed contracts between 1990 
and 1998.  He adopts a general to specific methodology, deleting variables that turn out to be 
insignificant.9   He finds that changes in concentration, and in particular the divestment of 
coal plant, had a large impact on prices, that PSP was reduced by the introduction of NETA 
(because Capacity Payments were abolished), but that SMP apparently rose.  He concludes 
that the costs of introducing NETA outweighed the benefits, given that capacity disposals 
could have been accomplished at a relatively low cost, and assuming that Capacity Payments 
might have been cheaply abolished while leaving the rest of the Pool’s arrangements intact.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 It is not equal to the ratio between available capacity (controlling for strategic behaviour) and peak demand 
during the month, which would form the basis for our “ideal” regressor, but should be closely related to it. 
9
 The Price Undertakings of 1994-6 (which reduced SMP), and the gas moratorium of December 1997-October 
2000 (which raised PSP), together with the volume of coal contracts, were regulatory dummies that proved 
significant in the regressions most comparable to ours. 
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5. RESULTS – A STATIC VIEW OF NETA 
 
Our first hypothesis was that the introduction of NETA might have caused a change in the 
level of the Lerner index, at the time that the rules changed.  Using a static model of the 
market for a non-storable commodity, we would not expect a spillover from a future change 
in market rules to current prices.  On this basis, a dummy variable set to 1 from April 2001 
onwards should capture the impact of NETA.10  As stated earlier, our dependent variables are 
Lerner indices, and we calculate these for SMP (plus its successor, the UKPX Reference Price 
Data) and for PSP (plus the overall cost of electricity in the post-NETA period).  Our 
estimating regressions were: 
 
SMPLerner = α + β1 Herfindahl + β2 Herfindahl2 + β3 Demand/Capacity + β4 NETA 
 
PSPLerner = α + β1 Herfindahl + β2 Herfindahl2 + β3 Demand/Capacity + β4 NETA   
 
and  
 
PSPLerner = α + β1 Herfindahl + β2 Herfindahl2 + β3 Demand/Capacity + β4 NETA  
  + β5Sept00 
 
We used Generalised Least Squares in Shazam to account for serial correlation.  Our results 
(table 1) show that both the Herfindahl index and its square are highly significant in 
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 We used data for the period up to 26 March 2001, the last day of the Pool’s operation, for our final month of 
“Pool” prices, and discarded the first five days of prices under NETA, which might have been heavily affected 
by participants’ learning. 
Table 1: Regression results on Lerner indices 
 SMP  (April 96-September 02) PSP (April 96-September 02) PSP (April 96-September 02) 
With Sept 2000 dummy 
 
 
 
Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value 
Constant -0.9234 0.3314 0.0068 -0.6018 0.3412 0.0820 -0.5433 0.3185 0.0924 
Herfindahl 12.2250 3.8551 0.0022 11.2170 3.9602 0.0060 10.1310 3.7038 0.0078 
Herfindahl 2 -39.3990 13.609 0.0050 -38.7230 14.139 0.0077 -34.6440 13.224 0.0107 
Demand / 
Capacity  
 
0.7310 0.2839 0.0121 0.5475 0.2976 0.0699 0.5554 0.2773 0.0489 
Neta* 0.0619 0.0631 0.3292 -0.0422 0.0632 0.5064 -0.0439 0.0589 0.4584 
Sept 2000       0.2548 0.0709 0.0006 
    
    
Adjusted R2 
 
0.6511 0.5831 0.6416 
SSE 
 
0.3729 0.5114 0.4336 
Durbin-
Watson 
   
1.6148 1.7242 1.7355 
Akaike 
(1974)-AIC 
 
0.0054 0.0075 0.0065 
Schwarz 
(1978)- SC 
 
0.0063 0.0087 0.0078 
Sample Size 78 78 78 
*Dummy from April 2001 
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explaining the level of electricity prices, as expected.  The ratio of demand to capacity is 
significant at the 5% level in explaining the Lerner index for SMP, but is only significant at 
10% in explaining the Lerner index for PSP.  This might seem surprising, since PSP 
incorporates the capacity payments that were intended to reflect the level of spare capacity on 
the system – however, remember that we use the level of registered capacity, as opposed to 
capacity actually available in a given month, which could affect the results.  Furthermore, we 
have already commented on the ability of the capacity payment mechanism to produce 
counter-intuitive results at times. 
 We find that the dummy variable for NETA is insignificant in all three regressions.  It 
is positive in the regression for SMP (a result which we regard as random noise, since we had 
no strong “prior” that the move to NETA would raise the level of prices) and negative in the 
regressions for PSP.  The level of the latter coefficient, of –0.04, equates to a reduction in the 
price of electricity of about £1.20/MWh, given the level of marginal cost and the Lerner index 
prevailing at the end of the 1990s.  The one component of the Pool Selling Price that was 
eliminated with the switch to NETA was the Capacity Payment, and this averaged 
£2.78/MWh over the last three years of the Pool’s life.  We note that given the level of spare 
capacity on the system at that time, the marginal value of capacity (which Capacity Payments 
were intended to reflect) was almost certainly well below that figure.  We can also measure 
the impact of the changes in concentration and spare capacity between 1997/8 and 2001/2, on 
a similar basis.  The Herfindahl index fell from approximately 0.16 to 0.08, which would have 
reduced SMP by £6.31/MWh and PSP by £5.78/MWh, based on a marginal cost of 
£13/MWh.  The demand/capacity ratio fell from 0.55 to 0.50, which was sufficient to reduce 
Monthly Lerner Indices
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SMP by £1.36/MWh and PSP by £1.35/MWh.  It is slightly surprising that the price including 
capacity payments appears to be no more affected by the level of spare capacity connected to 
the system, but we have already commented on the flaws of Capacity Payments. 
 
 
6. RESULTS – A DYNAMIC VIEW OF NETA 
 
Our results so far are consistent with those of Bower (2002), and in line with the theoretical 
arguments that suggested NETA would not have a significant impact on the price of 
electricity, apart from the direct effect of abolishing capacity payments.  However, a visual 
inspection of our data (figure 2) reveals an obvious fall in the Lerner indices in October 2000, 
six months before the introduction of NETA.  Neither of our main explanatory variables 
changes dramatically at this time, although the Herfindahl index does dip below 0.1 for the 
first time.  This was due to the last of PowerGen’s plant sales, and National Power’s 
demerger.    
 A possible explanation for this drop in the Lerner indices may come from a more 
“dynamic” view of the electricity market.  Recall that Sweeting (2001) had found evidence of 
behaviour consistent with tacit collusion during the late 1990s.  Such behaviour normally 
depends upon how participants see the future of their market – tacit collusion implies giving 
away the present profits that would come from less collusive behaviour, which is only 
sensible if the participants believe that continued collusion can bring them greater future 
profits.  If the generators believed that they would not be able to maintain a collusive 
equilibrium after the introduction of NETA, then they might have had to abandon any tacitly 
collusive practices once NETA drew near.  The extra profit that they could have gained from 
only a few more months of tacit collusion was no longer enough to outweigh the immediate 
profits from more competitive behaviour.  We therefore ran a new set of regressions, with a 
separate dummy variable for the “pre-NETA” period of October 2000 to March 2001.  
 The Herfindahl index is not significant at any level in any of these regressions, 
although the impact of the ratio of demand to capacity is hardly changed.  The dummy 
variable for NETA is now negative in all our regressions, and significant in the second 
regression for PSP.  The dummy for the six-month period preceding NETA is larger and more 
significant than the NETA dummy, which we find slightly worrying.  Admittedly, the autumn 
of 2000 saw an increase in marginal costs, which might not have been fully passed through to 
prices.  In general, though, there was no reason to expect that anticipation of NETA would 
actually drive mark-ups below the level that would be sustained under NETA itself.  F-tests 
revealed that the coefficients on the two dummy variables were not significantly different 
from each other.  We therefore consolidated the two dummy variables into a single variable, 
“para-NETA”, equal to one from October 2000 onwards. 
As before, the Herfindahl index is insignificant, while the ratio of demand to capacity 
is largely unaffected by the choice of the dummy variable.  The new dummy variable for the 
period leading up to and after NETA is negative and highly significant in all three regressions.  
The reductions in concentration reduced SMP by £0.71/MWh and PSP by £1.25/MWh.  The 
lower ratio of demand to capacity reduced SMP by £1.08/MWh and PSP by £1.40/MWh, 
while the introduction of NETA appears to have reduced SMP by £4/MWh and PSP by 
£4.86/MWh. 
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 We therefore seem to have two conflicting hypotheses on the impact of NETA.  Our 
Table 2: Regression results on Lerner indices 
 SMP (April 96- September 02) PSP (April 96- September 02) 
 
PSP (April 96- September 02) 
With Sept 2000 dummy 
 
 
 
Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value 
Constant -0.3758 0.3660 0.3080 -0.0033 0.3692 0.9929 -0.1041 0.3449 0.7637 
Herfindahl 4.9940 4.4383 0.2642 2.9880 4.5151 0.5102 4.3416 4.2296 0.3081 
Herfindahl 2 -17.6960 14.968 0.2410 -13.3160 15.447 0.3915 -16.8170 14.461 0.2488 
Demand / 
Capacity  
 
0.7967 0.2696 0.0042 0.6399 0.2803 0.0254 0.5899 0.2603 0.0265 
Pre-Neta† 
-0.1926 0.0707 0.0081 -0.2232 0.0716 0.0026 -0.1526 0.0702 0.0332 
Neta* -0.0914 0.0802 0.2583 -0.2017 0.0772 0.0110 -0.1602 0.0725 0.0305 
Sept 2000       0.2057 0.0753 0.0079 
          
    
Adjusted R2 
 
0.6785 0.6274 0.6574 
SSE 
 
0.3389 0.4509 0.4088 
Durbin-
Watson 
 
1.6624 1.7400 1.7649 
Akaike 
(1974) -AIC 
 
0.0051 0.0067 0.0063 
Schwarz 
(1978)- SC 
 
0.0061 0.0081 0.0077 
Sample Size 78 78 78 
†Dummy from October 2000 – March 2001 
* Dummy from April 2001 
Table 3: Regression results on Lerner indices 
 SMP (April 96- September 02) PSP (April 96- September 02) 
 
PSP (April 96- September 02) 
With Sept 2000 dummy 
 
 
 
Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value Coefficient SE P-value 
Constant -0.1196 0.3357 0.7227 0.0534 0.3284 0.8714 -0.1240 0.3154 0.6953 
Herfindahl 2.8919 4.3059 0.5039 2.5288 4.2624 0.5548 4.5039 4.0762 0.2729 
Herfindahl 2 -11.0060 14.591 0.4531 -11.7590 14.635 0.4243 -17.3640 13.946 0.2171 
Demand / 
Capacity  
 
0.6214 0.2509 0.0156 0.5953 0.2495 0.0196 0.6054 0.2344 0.0118 
Para-Neta * -0.1615 0.0690 0.0221 -0.2137 0.0658 0.0018 -0.1557 0.0649 0.0190 
Sept 2000       0.2041 0.0741 0.0075 
    
    
Adjusted R2 
 
0.6709 0.6319 0.6621 
SSE 
 
0.3517 0.4515 0.4088 
Durbin-
Watson 
 
1.6572 1.7415 1.7650 
Akaike 
(1974) -AIC 
 
0.0051 0.0066 0.0061 
Schwarz 
(1978)- SC 
 
0.0060 0.0077 0.0073 
Sample Size 78 78 78 
* Dummy from October 2000 
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“static” regression suggests that NETA had little impact on prices, and that the reduction was 
largely due to increasing competition and additional capacity.  Our “dynamic” story suggests 
that the increases in competition had failed to reduce prices, but that the imminent prospect of 
new trading rules that allowed prices to fall.  The standard statistical criteria (adjusted R-
squared, Akaike (1974) Information Criterion and Schwarz (1978) Criterion) all favour the 
regressions from table 3.  
A number of commentators have suggested other factors that could have affected 
electricity prices from October 2000 onwards.  Chief among these is the suggestion that 
National Power and PowerGen would have had a strong incentive to keep prices high while 
they were attempting to sell power stations, but that this incentive would have fallen as soon 
as the sales were completed, in October 2000.  This would give a step change in mark-ups at 
the critical time.   
An alternative version of the dynamic story is that generators faced with an imminent 
rise in competition would be able to continue colluding, but not to the same extent.  Lower 
prices would reduce the gain from defection, bringing it down to the decreasing punishment 
that could be imposed in the remaining life of the Pool.  This would produce a gradual decline 
in prices, rather than the sudden drop we observe. 
Another possible cause of a sudden drop in prices might be the end of the gas 
moratorium, since Bower’s results pointed its importance in raising prices.  One hypothesis is 
that the incumbents felt free to charge more while the moratorium protected them from entry.  
However, the moratorium did not prevent entrants from planning new stations and signing 
Connection Agreements with NGC,11 in readiness for construction once it was lifted.  The 
incumbents were still protected from immediate entry after the end of the moratorium, given 
the time required to build a new station.  A further set of regressions (available from the 
authors) did not find a significant coefficient for a dummy variable covering the moratorium 
period. 
  
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The results presented in table 1 and table 3 give very different impressions of the impact of 
NETA.  Table 1 is consistent with the warnings given by a number of economists in the run-
up to the change in trading arrangements, who argued that changing the market rules would 
have little impact on prices, and that the main hope for lower prices would come from greater 
competition.  Additional capacity had some effect on prices, but the main reductions were 
indeed due to reductions in concentration.  This interpretation is based on the idea that since 
electricity is a non-storable commodity, the price for March delivery cannot depend on events 
expected to take place in April.   
 The counter-argument relies on the hypothesis that generators might have been 
engaging in tacit collusion in the late 1990s, but that they became unable to sustain this a few 
months before the introduction of NETA, once there was no longer a sufficient period in 
which “punishment” strategies could be imposed.  If this argument is accepted, then it is 
legitimate to look for price effects in anticipation of the change in trading rules, and we do 
indeed find a dramatic reduction in mark-ups six months before the abolition of the Pool.  
Conversely, the reductions left to be explained by increased competition and spare capacity 
are much lower, and so these appear to be far less effective in bringing prices down. 
                                                          
11
 NGC(1999) reports that 5 GW of plant was contracted for future entry during 1998/9.  
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We are currently inclined to support this second hypothesis.  The regressions are a 
better fit to the data, and Sweeting (2001) gives convincing evidence of tacit collusion for 
much of the critical period, although his work stops tantalisingly short, in September 2000.  
As the introduction of NETA drew near, could the generators have realised that they were in a 
finitely repeated game, and believed that they would not be able to maintain high prices under 
the new trading rules?  If so, they would have had every reason to switch from a high-price to 
a low-price equilibrium, even while still trading through in the Pool.  Some anecdotes within 
the industry are consistent with this view, although others suggest that the generators chose a 
lower price strategy because they were no longer selling plant.  An examination of the bid 
data around this time would show which companies changed their strategies, and might allow 
us to better discriminate between explanations for the fall in prices.  
A number of academic economists (including one of us) had suggested that NETA 
would not necessarily be less vulnerable to high prices than the Pool-based system.  If our 
tentative explanation for the fall in margins that preceded NETA is indeed correct, it is 
perhaps fortunate for consumers that the companies appear not to have listened to them.  
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